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LEO V KERR-MCGEE CHEMICAL CORP.: RECOGNIZING A
NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN TOXIC
TORT ACTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Technological advancements that enhance daily life pose
great potential risk to human health. Each day, toxic chemicals,
the byproducts of common items, are released into the environ-
ment. The harm that results from the release of these chemicals is
often referred to as an "environmental hazard," "environmental
tort," or "toxic tort." Toxic torts, unlike traditional torts such as
assault or defamation, are much more subtle in the way they cause
harm. Chemicals released into the environment today may take
years before the harm is caused or before the harm is realized. This
gradual and often less perceived source of harm distinguishes toxic
torts from traditional torts, and thus, mandates the development of
unique environmental law principles; principles not predicated
upon other established areas of the law.
Environmental regulation is often forced to incorporate princi-
ples of liability from state corporate law. Such principles may be
foreign to the underlying rationales of environmental law. Corpo-
rate law was not designed to protect individuals or the environment
from injury and, consequently, is a poor conduit to that end. As a
result, the fusion of environmental and corporate law principles
does not adequately protect society from toxic torts. This commin-
gling of concepts clouds what were once bright lines of corporate
liability. Uniformity and predictability, hallmarks of successful cor-
porate planning,1 guide corporate law in an efficient manner but
lead to capricious results when applied in the environmental torts
arena.
Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.2 demonstrates the need for the
development of environmental law principles apart from corporate
1. See, e.g., Cavins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (E.D. Wis.
1985) (holding uniformity and predictability require labor-contract disputes to be
resolved by reference to federal law); See also In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79 (D.P.R. 1990) (holding uniformity and predictability as
important factors in choice of law questions); Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.,
722 F. Supp. 641 (D. Colo. 1989) (same).
2. 37 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1994). This suit was originally brought in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, but was removed to the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Id. at 98.
(109)
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law principles. In Kerr-McGee, the plaintiffs alleged that their
parents' deaths were the result of exposure to thorium and other
hazardous substances that were deposited on land owned by a pred-
ecessor corporation of the defendant.3 Although defendant, Kerr-
McGee purchased the assets of the predecessor corporation, at no
time did it own the contaminated land.4 Furthermore, the prede-
cessor corporation was dissolved prior to the institution of the law-
suit by the plaintiffs. 5
The Kerr-McGee scenario highlights the flawed legal remedies
for toxic torts. A general rule of corporate law dictates that a suc-
cessor corporation that merely buys the assets of another corpora-
tion is not liable for the tortuous actions of its predecessor. 6
Therefore, as a successor, Kerr-McGee could be liable only if a
court refused to adhere to this general rule. Kerr-McGee would not
have anticipated such judicial action and, in the context of corpo-
rate law, such a decision would be unfair. Yet, the alternative of
finding Kerr-McGee not liable is also unappealing. Kerr-McGee
profited from the reputation of its predecessor which was no longer
in existence, but caused immeasurable damage to the plaintiffs. Ar-
guably, Kerr-McGee stands in the shoes of its predecessor and is
liable for the predecessor's injurious acts.
Certain ideological precepts of tort law and corporate law con-
flict. Under tort law, Kerr-McGee was not only the party that bene-
fited from the injuries that plaintiffs suffered, but it was also the
party that could most equitably distribute the burdens suffered by
plaintiffs. According to this reasoning, Kerr-McGee should be lia-
ble. Conversely, under corporate law, such an interrelation be-
tween the successor corporation and the predecessor corporation is
too attenuated to impose liability. Judicial activism, under the guise
of environmental law, has tied these two theories of law together.
These efforts produce decisions that neither protect people from
toxic torts, nor provide corporations with the predictability neces-
sary to adequately protect themselves from liability.7 This Note pro-
3. Id.
4. Id. For a discussion of the transfers involved, see infra text accompanying
notes 10-17. Significantly, the manufacture of incandescent glass mantles at the
NewJersey site which caused contamination ceased with this initial sale. Id. at 98.
5. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 98.
6. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 1974);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968); Tift v. Forage
King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Wis. 1982).
7. For a further discussion of the incongruous decisions that have resulted
from common law decisions regarding successor liability in toxic tort cases, see
infra notes 88-103.
2
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poses a uniform approach that clearly identifies when liability
would attach to a successor corporation. Congress can achieve this
goal by establishing a federal cause of action for such "toxic torts."s
This Note demonstrates the need for a federal cause of action
for toxic torts by analyzing the facts and procedural history of the
Kerr-McGee decision. In addition, this Note traces the steps taken by
the Third Circuit in trying to resolve the issues presented in Kerr-
McGee. Special emphasis is given to the effects that the holding of
Kerr-McGee and similar cases have had on successor corporation lia-
bility. Finally, this Note argues that there is a need for the establish-
ment of a federal cause of action for toxic torts based on the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).9
II. FACTS
From the turn of the century until 1940, Welsbach In-
candescent Light Company ("Welsbach") maintained and operated
a plant in Gloucester City, New Jersey.' 0 While manufacturing in-
candescent gas mantles, Welsbach contaminated the NewJersey site
with the radioactive element, thorium.11 In 1940, Welsbach sold its
gas mantle business to an Illinois competitor, the Lindsay Light and
Chemical Company ("Lindsay"). 12 Pursuant to the sale, Lindsay ac-
quired Welsbach's outstanding orders, records, formulas, raw
materials, inventory, customer lists, gas mantle production line, and
the right to use the "Welsbach" name.13 However, Lindsay never
took ownership of any land owned by Welsbach.14 Subsequently,
Kerr-McGee acquired Lindsay.15 The land in NewJersey, which was
the original site of Welsbach, was never acquired by Kerr-McGee. 16
In 1944, Welsbach was dissolved.' 7
8. For a further discussion of establishment of a Federal cause of action, see
infra notes 135-149 and accompanying text.
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).





15. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 98. In both the district court and the Third Circuit
decisions, Kerr-McGee was considered to be standing in the shoes of Lindsay Light
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In 1961, Thomas and Catherine Bekes and their daughters, ap-
pellees Elaine Leo and Linda Yoder, moved to a home located near
the Welsbach factory in Gloucester City.1 8 In December of 1988,
Thomas Bekes died of bladder cancer.' 9 In March of 1991, the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection contacted
Catherine Bekes and informed her of the high levels of gamma ra-
diation and thorium which existed on her property. 20 As a result,
she was forced to relocate.2 1 Shortly thereafter, Catherine Bekes
also died of bladder cancer.22 Leo and Yoder sued Kerr-McGee for
their parents' death and the potential risk of cancer arising from
their exposure to thorium and other waste substances generated
and deposited by Welsbach on the Gloucester factory site.23 Under
a theory of strict liability, plaintiffs argued that Kerr-McGee was lia-
ble for injuries arising from actions taken by its predecessor
corporation. 24
Kerr-McGee subsequently filed a motion to dismiss under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6).25 The motion alleged that
plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be
granted because Kerr-McGee never owned the Gloucester City land
or factory.26 The trial court denied the motion and Kerr-McGee
moved for an interlocutory appeal, which the Third Circuit
granted.2 7 The central question before the court was under what
circumstances does a successor corporation become liable for the
environmental hazards of its predecessor.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 98.
21. Id. The NewJersey Spill Compensation Fund acquired the residence. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The plaintiffs also sued under theories of negligence and breach of
warranty, but the Third Circuit found no support for liability under either theory.
Id. at 98 n.l.
25. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 97-98.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court granted this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This
section provides in pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1992).
4




A successor corporation that purchases all the assets of a corpo-
ration is not liable for the torts of the acquired company merely by
virtue of the succession of ownership.2 8 The nonliability of a suc-
cessor corporation is often referred to as the general rule of corpo-
rate law. However, a successor corporation can be liable for the
tortuous actions of its predecessor if there is a high degree of con-
tinuity between the successor corporation and its predecessor. 29
This theory of successor corporate liability developed as a narrowly
applied remedy.30
There are four universally accepted instances when a remedy
for successor corporate liability is appropriate. 31 First, a successor
corporation may be liable if it either impliedly or expressly consents
to accept the liabilities of the selling company.3 2 Second, liability
may attach if the seller fraudulently enters the transaction to evade
liability from creditors.33 Third, the successor corporation may be
liable if it is merely a continuation of the selling corporation. 34 Fi-
nally, if the transaction amounts to a de facto consolidation or
merger of the selling and purchasing corporation, the successor
corporation may be liable.3 5
28. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir.
1974)(citing Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 527-28 (E.D. Pa. 1971));
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (N.J. 1981).
29. JerryJ. Phillips, Product Line Continuity And Successor Corporation Liability, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 906, 907 (1983) (discussing successor corporate liability).
30. See Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D.N.J. 1976);
Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778, 780 (hi1. 1979).
31. Some authorities hold that there is a fifth exception where elements of a
purchase in good faith were lacking or the transfer was without consideration.
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 n.3 (Mich. 1976).
32. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980). The purchas-
ing corporation will usually assume certain liabilities necessary to continue the
conduct of the business uninterrupted, while unwanted or contingent liabilities
will often be avoided through escape clauses in the sales contract that deny respon-
sibility for all liability not expressly assumed. Howard L. Shecter, Acquiring Corpo-
rate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is It A Myth?. 1986 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137,
139 (1986).
33. See Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24 (Nev. 1969). Some commentators
note that the second exception is simply an application of the general rule against
fraudulent conveyances. Shecter, supra note 32, at 140.
34. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 892. This exception has historically only been ap-
plied in limited circumstances; however, a more liberal variation of this exception
has emerged called "continuity of enterprise."
35. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974).
The theory of de facto merger initially evolved in states like Pennsylvania as a
means to provide dissenters' rights for shareholders frustrated by corporate trans-
actions designed to avert statutory dissenters' rights. Shecter, supra note 32, at 139.
5
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The first two situations do not frequently occur.3 6 However,
the business continuation exception and the de facto consolidation
or merger do frequently occur, and are collectively referred to as a
de facto merger. 37 The identifying component of a de facto merger
is that the purchasing corporation effectively becomes the selling
corporation.38 The sale of a corporation's assets alone is insuffi-
cient to trigger a de facto merger; rather, courts traditionally con-
sider several factors in determining if a de facto merger has
occurred. 39
Over time, tort law developed to reflect society's concern for
the protection of the consumer and the need for a safer work place.
This influence resulted in the adoption of the theory of strict liabil-
ity.40 Corporate law, however, bases successor liability on the pro-
tection of shareholders and other financial interests. Nevertheless,
corporate law was forced to confront the principles of strict liability
which were emerging in tort law.4 1 Yet, the public policy concerns
that are the cornerstone of strict liability are foreign to the rules of
corporate law. As strict liability became more entrenched in the
judicial framework, the question arose whether the policies under-
lying strict liability would necessitate a special exception to the gen-
eral rule of nonliability for a successor corporation. 42 In McKee v.
For a further discussion of the development of the theory of de facto merger, see
Shecter, supra note 32, at 139.
36. Phillips, supra note 29, at 908. One commentator noted: "[f]raudulent
transfers are rarer, probably because corporate directors do not favor illegal con-
duct; furthermore, illegal conduct is bad business and is often detectable .... A
transferee also is unlikely to assume the seller's debts expressly and can easily avoid
doing so by carefully drafting the purchase agreement." Id.
37. Id. at 909.
38. See Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
The court in Menacho noted, "[i]f a corporation continues to exist, or is merged
into another, liability is retained. However, the sale of a corporation's assets alone
does not contemplate the sale of the corporation's contingent tort liability." Id.
39. Menacho, 420 F. Supp. at 133. The court listed several factors to consider
when deciding if a de facto merger had occurred: (1) a continuity of sharehold-
ers; (2) a cessation of ordinary business and dissolution of the predecessor as soon
as practically possible; (3) a continuity of management, personnel, physical loca-
tion, assets, and general business operation; and (4) the purchasing corporation's
assumption of all liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operation of the seller corpora-
tion. Id. (citing Shannon v. Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich.
1974)).
40. The California Supreme Court first adopted the concept of strict liability
in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (Cal.
1962).
41. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30 (Cal. 1977).
42. Some courts continued to apply the general rule of corporate nonliability.
See Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d. 842 (1975); McKee v. Harris-Sey-
6
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Harris-Seybold Co.,43 the New Jersey Superior Court held that a suc-
cessor could not be held liable for the actions of its predecessors.4
The McKee court took a narrow approach to applying the excep-
tions to the general rule of corporate law.45 As a result, some courts
have tried to modify corporate law rules to make them more re-
sponsive to the strict liability rationales.46
The First Circuit addressed the difficulty of applying the gen-
eral rule of corporate law to a tort action in the case Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co.47 In that case, an employee was injured by a negligently
designed printing press manufactured by B. Offen & Company.48
After the president and sole owner of the company died, the em-
ployees bought the business and continued the operation. 49 Subse-
quently, the plaintiff sought relief from the successor corporation. 50
The issue in Cyr was whether there was sufficient continuity be-
tween the predecessor and the successor to apply the de facto
merger exception to the general corporate rule. 51 The court ruled
that a de facto merger had occurred and that the successor corpo-
ration was liable.5 2 The holding in Cyris significant for it expanded
the scope of successor liability by not requiring continuity of owner-
ship between the successor and predecessor. Rather, the court in
Cyr relied upon the public policy principle that "the hazards of pre-
bold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970). Traditionally, a de facto
merger was not triggered unless there was a stock for cash sale; that is, the stock-
holders of the selling corporation would remain the stockholders of the purchas-
ing corporation. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977).
Therefore, a narrow application of McKee, would establish liability based on: con-
tinuity in management, shareholders, personnel, physical location, assets and gen-
eral business operations. Travis, 565 F.2d at 447. However, courts that continued
to apply a narrow approach of the exceptions to the general corporate rule were
highly criticized. See Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 419 A.2d 1151,
1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (referring to McKee as "harsh"); Wilson v. Fare
Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (referring to McKee
as limited in its holding); Ortiz, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 850 (dissenting) (criticizing
majority for ignoring reasonable expectation of consumer).
43. McKee, 264 A.2d at 98.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 102-107.
46. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974). The
court in Knapp did two important things: first, it disregarded the requirement for
dissolution of the selling corporation as a prerequisite for imposition of de facto
merger. Id. Second, the court analyzed the case in terms of the policies underly-
ing strict liability. Id. at 365.




51. Id. at 1152.
52. Cyr, 501 A.2d at 1154.
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dicting and insuring for risk from defective products are better
borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer."5 3
A. Continuity of Enterprise Theory
Despite the holding in Cyr, over time, courts relied less on cor-
porate law principles to settle product liability cases. In Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co.,54 the Michigan Supreme Court developed
the theory of "continuity of enterprise," which emphasized tort the-
ories more than corporate principles. 55 The theory is a special
product liability exception to the general rule that an asset pur-
chaser is not liable for the seller's obligations.5 6 In the case, the
court recognized that the principles developed to protect business
creditors and minority shareholders were often insufficient to re-
spond to the needs of product liability plaintiffs.57 Thus, the con-
tinuity of enterprise theory imposes liability if there is a sufficient
"continuity of interest" between the transferor and transferee.58 To
determine if such a continuity existed in Turner, the court focused
on the actual intent of the successor to assume the liability of its
predecessor. 59
B. Product Line Exception
Alternatively, the California Supreme Court articulated what is
now referred to as the "product line exception" in the case of Ray v.
53. Id. Other courts have likewise adapted the general rule of corporate law
to fit the needs of product liability plaintiffs. In fact, expansion of the general rule
of corporate law has spawned two additional theories of corporate liability in prod-
uct liability cases: the continuation of enterprise and product line exceptions. For
a further discussion of the movement away from the general corporate rule on
non-liability for successor corporations, see Shecter, supra note 32, at 140.
54. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 878. The court stated that there would have clearly been liability
under a de facto merger had the acquisition been made with stock instead of cash.
Id. at 883. The court could not find a reason to treat the acquisition of a company
for cash any different from stock. Id.
58. Id.
59. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878. Thus, liability would be imposed upon the
successor if four elements were satisfied:
(1) A continuity of the outward appearance of the enterprise, its manage-
ment, personnel, physical plant, assets, and operation; (2) the dissolution
of the seller corporation as soon after the transfer of assets as is legally
and practically possible; (3) assumption by the transferee of those liabili-
ties and obligations necessary to the uninterrupted continuation of nor-
mal business operations; and (4) the purchasing corporation held itself
out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller corporation.
Id. at 884.
8
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Alad Cop.60 Similar to the holding in Turner, the court in Ray aban-
doned the general rule of corporate law. Instead, the court
adopted a policy that reflected the principles underlying strict lia-
bility in tort and products law.61 The court focused on the princi-
ples of compensation and cost-spreading to develop a three prong
test for successor liability. First, the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer must be virtually destroyed by the successor's
acquisition of the business.62 Second, the successor must assume
the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role.63 Third, a succes-
sor's responsibility must be a burden that has attached itself to the
original manufacturer's goodwill which has inured to the succes-
sor's continued operation of the business.6 Thus, liability is based
on the continuation of the successor to manufacture the product
which has caused an injury.65
Both the continuity of interest and product line theories are
special exceptions to the general rule of corporate law in product
liability cases. The continuity of interest exception uses the public
policy rationales of strict liability to broaden the scope of corporate
successor liability. 66 The product line doctrine, however, uses those
same public policy rationales to create an entirely new liability for
corporate successors. In Ramirez v. Amsted Industries,6 7 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey accepted the "product line approach" as enun-
ciated in Ray.68 The Ramirez case was the foundation upon which
60. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977). In Ray, the plaintiff was injured as a result of a fall
from a defective ladder on which he had been working. Id. at 4. One year prior to
the accident, Alad Corporation ("Alad I") had sold to Lightening Maintenance
Corporation all its assets, physical plant, manufacturing equipment, inventories of
raw materials and finished goods, trade name, goodwill, and records of manufac-
turing designs and employment of personnel. Id. at 6. As part of the agreement of
sale, Alad I agreed to dissolve and help the purchasing corporation form a new
corporation called Mlad Corporations ("Alad II"). Id. The principle stockholders
of lad I agreed not to compete with lad II for 42 months, and in that period to
act as a consultant for lad II. Id. Once in operation, Mlad II continued to manu-
facture the same product as Alad I, using the same equipment and employees, and
selling to the same customers. Id. at 6. No contractual provisions ever stated that
Alad II would assume any of the liabilities of lad I for defective products made
and sold by lad I prior to the acquisition by lad II. Id. The injured plaintiff in
Ray sued Alad II on a theory of strict tort liability.
61. Id. at 8-9.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For a further discussion of product line theory, see Shecter, supra note 32,
at 145-48.
66. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 818-19 (N.J. 1981).
67. 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
68. Id. at 820.
KFR-MCCEE
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the New Jersey courts extended liability to successors who contin-
ued to manufacture the product line of their predecessor.
69
In Ramirez, the plaintiff was injured while operating an alleg-
edly defective power press on the premises of his employer.70 The
machine had been manufactured by Johnson Machine and Press
Company in 1948 or 1949.71 In 1956, Johnson transferred all of its
assets and liabilities to Bontrager Construction Corporation in ex-
change for Bontrager common stock.72 In 1962, Amsted Industries
purchased all of Bontrager's assets, including all of the Johnson as-
sets that Bontrager acquired in 1956, and the right to use the trade
name of 'Johnson."73 The agreement specifically excluded Am-
sted's assumption of liability for tort claims arising from defective
products manufactured by any predecessor.74 In 1965, the corpo-
rate existence of Johnson was dissolved. 75 Thereafter, plaintiff
brought suit against Amsted seeking to hold it liable as a successor
corporation. 76
The Ramirez court rejected the general rule of corporate law.
Instead, the court adopted the emerging product line exception
and found Amsted liable as a successor corporation.77 The defend-
ant in Ramirez advanced three separate arguments against the impo-
sition of successor corporation liability: 1) the imposition of liability
would have a crippling effect on the ability of small manufacturers
to transfer ownership of its business; 2) the imposition of liability
on a defendant, who was the second successor of the manufacturer
who placed the product which caused the injury into the stream of
commerce twenty eight years ago, would be unfair; and 3) the new
69. Id.
70. Id. at 812.
71. Id. at 812-13.
72. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 813.
73. Id. at 814.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 815.
76. Id. at 813.
77. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 820. The court in Ramirez weighed the public policy
justifications for strict liability in both Turner and Ray. Id. at 818-19. First, the
court reasoned that public policy in Turner was used merely as a justification for
broadening the scope of the traditional corporate successor liability. Id. Second,
the Ramirez court noted that the court used public policy in Ray to create an en-
tirely new rule of successor liability in products cases. Id. Furthermore, the Rami-
rez court indicated that Ray focused on the continued manufacturing of the
product causing the injury, while in Turner the focus was on the continuation of
the actual manufacturing operation. Id. at 818-19. Ultimately, the Ramirez court
found the focus of Ray to be more consistent in its application than was Turner. Id.
at 819.
10
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standard for liability for successor corporations should be applied
only prospectively. 78
The court in Ramirez recognized that the defendant's conten-
tions were legitimate concerns. 79 The first argument made by Am-
sted, however, was dismissed by the court according to the social
policies underlying the law of products liability.80 Thus, the cost of
injuries from defective products would be borne by the manufactur-
ing enterprise rather than the consuming public.8' The opinion of
the court also suggested that a successor corporation could protect
itself against these liabilities through the purchase of products lia-
bility insurance or through the use of full or partial indemnification
agreements.8 2
The court also dismissed Amsted's argument that it would be
unfair to impose liability for a predecessor's product manufactured
twenty-eight years, and two corporate transactions before, the acci-
dent occurred.83 The court reasoned that this argument called for
a limitation on the time frame in which a party can bring a cause of
action.8 4 The court determined that this decision should be left for
the legislature.85
Finally, the court denied Amsted's argument that a new stan-
dard for successor corporate liability should only be applied pro-
spectively.86 The court recognized that Amsted, and its insurance
78. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 822-24.
79. Id. at 822.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 823.
82. Id. at 822-23. Justice Schreiber in his concurring opinion provides over-
whelming contrary evidence that purchasers will not be able to obtain insurance to
cover themselves for future accidents caused by defective products made and sold
prior to the acquisition. Id. at 826 (citing SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Busi-
NESS, 28TH ANNUAL REPT., CH. 18, "IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON SMALL Busi-
NESS," 167-171, S. REP. No. 629, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Dep't of Commerce,
Interagency Task Force on Product Liability: Final Report at VI-2 to VI-38 (1977)).
For testimony stating that 21.6% of those businesses seeking product liability insur-
ance could not obtain it, see PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSURANCE: HEARINGS BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON CAPITAL, INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL
BusIMEsS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Part 1) 4 (1977). See also Kadens, Practitioner's
Guide to Treatment of Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL. L.
REv. 1, 22-25 (1978); Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the
Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Lia-
bility Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1000, 1002-04, 1022-24 (1980).
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carriers, had reasonably relied on the general rule of corporate law,
but their reliance was insufficient to deny plaintiff recovery. 87
C. Inconsistent Application of Liability Doctrines
The several suits brought against Amsted Industries88 illus-
trates the inconsistentjudgments that result from the application of
tort and corporate law in products liability cases. The facts in each
of these cases are virtually identical.8 9 Amsted was a corporation
that purchased another corporation that had, prior to Amsted's
ownership, manufactured defective punch presses.90 The defective
punch presses caused injuries to a number of people who sought to
hold Amsted liable.
In 1975, two years before the Ray decision, 91 Amsted Indus-
tries was sued as a successor corporation for the defective product
manufactured by its predecessor.92 In Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, the
California Court of Appeals applied the general rule of corporate
law and found that there was no successor corporation liability.93
However, in Korzetz v. Amsted Industries,94 the district court sitting in
Michigan redetermined Amsted's liability. 95 In Korzetz, the district
court applied the continuity of interest exception to the general
rule of corporate liability and found Amsted liable as a successor
87. Id. 823-24. The court noted, "[t] here is a basic justness in recognizing
that persons who have exercised the initiative to challenge the existing law should
be accorded relief if their claims - not yet resolved when the new rule of law is
announced - are ultimately vindicated." Id.
88. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb.
1982) (holding Amsted Industries not liable as corporate successor); Hernandez v.
Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (Il1. 1979) (same); Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe,
46 Cal. App. 3d 842 (Cal. 1975) (holding Amsted Industries not liable as successor
for defective products manufactured by its predecessor). Cf. Korzetz v. Amsted
Indus., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding Amsted liable as successor for
defective products manufactured by its predecessor); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus.,
431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981)(same).
89. For a discussion of the facts relating to Amsted's liability, see supra text
accompanying notes 67-87.
90. Ramez, 431 A.2d at 811.
91. For a discussion of Ray v. Alad Corp., see supra notes 60-65 and accompa-
nying text.
92. Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842 (Cal. 1975).
93. Id. at 846 (citing Pierce v. Riverside Mtg. Sec. Co., 77 P.2d 226 (Cal.
1938)). The court held that there was no express or implied assumption of liabil-
ity in the purchase agreement between defendant and second corporation; there
was no fraud; the consideration paid by Amsted was adequate; and there was
neither a consolidation or merger to justify a finding of continuation of the prede-
cessor. Id. at 847-49.
94. 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
95. Id.
12
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corporation.96 In the same year, in Hernandez v. Johnson Press
Corp.,97 an Illinois court refused to hold Amsted liable for the defec-
tive punch press of the original manufacturer. 98 In its opinion, the
court specifically refused to adopt the product line exception.99 Fol-
lowing Hernandez, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the case of
Ramirez, adopted the product line exception and found Amsted lia-
ble as a successor corporation. 100 The most recent decision con-
cerning Amsted's liability was the case of Jones v. Johnson Machine
and Press Co.101 In Jones, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected both
the product line and continuity of enterprise exception, and found
Amsted not liable as a successor corporation. 102 The court rea-
soned that Amsted did not create the risk of injury and was too far
removed from the transaction to have profited from the sale. 103
To date, Amsted Industries has been sued as a successor corpo-
ration, under the same facts, in five different jurisdictions: Califor-
nia, Michigan, Illinois, New Jersey, and Nebraska.10 4 Due to the
various manipulations of corporate and tort law, Amsted has been
subjected to liability in two of those jurisdictions. Amsted has lost
once under a continuity of enterprise exception and once under a
product line exception. 105
96. Id. at 143-44. The court noted that in relying on the Michigan decision of
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), it was not con-
fined to finding each element listed in that case when determining successor liabil-
ity. Id. Rather, the finding that a continuity of enterprise existed would be
justified with strong and convincing evidence. Id.
97. 388 N.E.2d 778 (Ill. 1979).
98. Id.
99 Id. at 780.
100. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 824-25. For a further discussion of Ramirez, see supra
text accompanying notes 67-87.
101. 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982).
102. Id. at 484. The court ruled that under the facts there was no justification
for departure from the general rule of non-liability for a purchasing corporation
except: when the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
the selling corporation's liability; when the transaction amounts to consolidation
or merger of the purchaser and seller corporations; when the purchaser corpora-
tion is merely a continuation of the seller corporation; or when the transaction is
entered into fraudulently to escape liability for such obligations. Id. at 483-84.
103. Id. at 484. The court also wrote: "[tihe public policy considerations
which motivate imposition of strict liability on those who create risk and obtain
profit by placing defective products in the stream of commerce do not necessarily
apply equally to successor corporations." Id.
104. For a further discussion of the individual holdings within each of these
states, see supra note 88.
105. Further discontinuity in successor corporation liability may occur as a
result of individual choice of law statutes that require application of exceptions not
adopted in the forum state. See, e.g., Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F.
Supp. 1282 (D. Colo. 1984). In Hickman, the plaintiff was injured by a copper
enameling product manufactured by defendant in Illinois. Id. at 1283. Illinois law
1996]
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A case that attempts to define the outer limits of successor cor-
porate liability principles in New Jersey is Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical
Corp. 10 6 In Kerr-McGee, the Third Circuit decided whether to extend
the Ramirez product line exception to impose tort liability on a com-
pany that neither polluted New Jersey land nor operated on New
Jersey land polluted by others. 0 7
IV. Lo v. KE R,-McG.E CH0EMCAL CORP.
A. The Majority Opinion
The Third Circuit in Kerr-McGee was faced with a case of first
impression. 10 8 This case involved an environmental tort action
brought in federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction which
confined the federal court to a role of predictor of state law. 109 The
court began its discussion by recognizing Ramirez as the leading
case in New Jersey on the extension of successor corporation liabil-
ity, 110 but decided that the Ramirez rationale did not fit the facts of
the case."' Specifically, the court found the plaintiffs' injuries to
be distinguishable from those in Ramirez.112 In Kerr-McGee, the
plaintiffs' injuries were not caused by a unit in the product line
manufactured first by Welsbach, and then by Kerr-McGee. 1 3
Rather, the injuries were caused by conditions created by Wels-
bach's operations on land which it retained control over after the
sale to Kerr-McGee." 4
The court then applied the Ramirez analysis in light of this dis-
tinction. 115 The Third Circuit determined that the destruction of
specifically rejects the product line exception. Id. at 1285. However, Colorado has
adopted the product line exception. Id. at 1285-86. Through a choice of law anal-
ysis, the Colorado court sought to apply its law, and the product line exception,
despite the fact that the contract of sale was completed in Illinois and the defend-
ant was a domiciliary of Illinois. Id. at 1286.
106. 37 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 1994).
107. For a further discussion of the facts of Kerr-McGee see supra notes 10-27
and accompanying text.
108. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 99.
109. Id. For a further discussion of the proper role of a federal court sitting
in diversity, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).





115. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 99-101. The court noted:
(1) the sale of the enterprise virtually destroyed the injured party's rem-
edy against the original manufacturer; (2) the successor has the ability to
assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role; and (3) it is fair
14
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an injured party's remedy was a necessary but insufficient basis on
which to attach liability.1 16 The court further noted that NewJersey
case law following Ramirez demonstrated that when a selling corpo-
ration remains a viable entity it is unnecessary to impose successor
liability. 117 In addition, the need for imposing successor liability is
contingent upon the inability of plaintiff to hold the predecessor
liable.'1 8 Thus, the court noted that a legally responsible party for
Welsbach's action might have existed." 9 However, the potential
existence of a culpable party was not used as a basis for refusing to
impose successor liability.'20
The court also held that Kerr-McGee could not practically
spread the risk of toxic torts from land it never acquired. 121 The
imposition of successor liability for toxic torts arising out of a prede-
cessor's operation would subject the product line purchaser to un-
foreseeable liability for an indefinite period of time. 122 The
impediment that such a holding would pose on commercial trans-
actions led the court to conclude that the Supreme Court of New
Jersey would not hold that a purchaser of a product line acquires its
predecessor's risk spreading role for toxic torts.128
Similarly, the Third Circuit found its holding to be consistent
with the rule followed in NewJersey that a manufacturer cannot be
strictly liable unless there was a defect at the time the product left
the manufacturer's control. 124 These principles led the court to de-
cide that Ramirez liability is "likely to be imposed in most cases, if at
all, for a limited period."' 25 Application of this "time scenario" sug-
gested to the court that it would be unusual for a successor in a
to require the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products
as that responsibility was a burden necessarily attached to the original
manufacturer's goodwill being enjoyed by the successor in the continued
operation of the business.
Id. (quoting Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 820 (NJ. 1981)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 99-100 (citing Lapollo v. General Elec. Co., 664 F. Supp. 178
(D.NJ. 1987)).
118. Id. at 100.
119. Id. at 99-100. Another defendant in the suit, U.G.I. apparently domi-
nated Welsbach at the time of the pollution. Id. However, Kerr-McGee did not
brief the case on the basis that plaintiffs had a remedy against U.G.I. and the Third
Circuit did not decide the case on that basis. Id. at 99 n.3.
120. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 99.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 100-101. The court noted that a product-line purchaser would not
be able to lessen the risks of toxic tort liability on land it did not own. Id.
123. Id. at 100.
124. Id. at 100-101.
125. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 100-101.
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product line case to be defending an action in the 1990's for a
product built in the 1940's.126
Finally, the Third Circuit determined that the good-will ac-
quired by Kerr-McGee through the acquisition of assets did not cre-
ate liability for the land upon which the predecessor manufactured
the product. 127 The court recognized that Kerr-McGee acquired a
gas mantle product line as opposed to the site at which Welsbach
manufactured the product.128 Thus, the assets Kerr-McGee ac-
quired were too attenuated from the instrumentality that actually
caused the harm to impose liability. These distinctions undermine
the core of the Ramirez analogy and support the Third Circuit's pre-
diction that Ramirez would not be extended to cover environmental
torts.
In support of its determination, the Third Circuit reviewed its
obligation to refrain from partaking in judicial activism when decid-
ing a diversity case. 129 The Third Circuit concluded that the district
court's ruling to extend the strict liability product line doctrine to
cover environmental torts should be reversed.' 30
B. Concurrence
Consistent with the Third Circuit's role as a predictor of state
law, Judge Atkins, in a concurring opinion, traced the development
of the "product line" exception in New Jersey.13 1 Contrary to the
majority decision, Judge Atkins determined that the district court
was correct in its extension of the strict liability product line doc-
trine to the environmental tort arena.'32 Judge Atkins found signif-
icant, the fact that Kerr-McGee purchased from Welsbach its entire
product line, patented process, goodwill, inventory, sales, records,
and trade name.13 3 Judge Atkins also reasoned that there was a suf-
ficient connection between the product lines of Kerr-McGee and
126. Id.
127. Id. at 101.
128. Id. The court further illustrated that the goodwill Kerr-McGee acquired
was attached to the gas mantles, not the site where Welsbach manufactured the
product. Id.
129. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 101.
130. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the decision of the district court was
premised on "the traditional New Jersey view that if you are injured somebody
ought to be liable for it," which is an approach that the Third Circuit rejects. Id.
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Welsbach to support the application of the product line
exception. 134
Buttressing this conclusion, Judge Atkins distinguished Kerr-Mc-
Gee from State Department of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp.135
Unlike Kerr-McGee, the successor corporation in Exxon operated a
separate business on the land once used by its predecessor.13 6
Therefore, Judge Atkins found the situation in Kerr-McGee to be
more analogous to Ramirez than Exxon.13 7 Kerr-McGee purchased
all or substantially all of the manufacturing assets of Welsbach.13 8
Additionally, Kerr-McGee continued essentially the same manufac-
turing process as Welsbach.139 Consequently, Kerr-McGee should
have been strictly liable for any defects in the units or waste pro-
duced from the production of the same product line, including
waste generated by Welsbach. 140
In addition, Judge Atkins reviewed the policies supporting Ra-
mirez and Ray and found the rationales used in these cases to be
equally applicable to Kerr-McGee.141 First, the plaintiffs' potential
remedy against Welsbach had been totally destroyed through the
acquisition of Welsbach by Kerr-McGee.142 Second, the imposition
of liability upon Kerr-McGee was consistent with the public policy
of spreading the cost of injuries to a party in a better position to
bear the costs. 143 Third, Kerr-McGee could have obtained products
liability insurance or entered into a full or partial indemnification
or escrow agreement with the selling corporation.'4 The imposi-
134. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 102.
135. Id. (citing Exxon, 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1977)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. Judge Atkins noted that the Kerr-McGee situation would remain
analogous to Ramirez even if all the assets were acquired by cash, and Kerr-McGee
and its predecessors undertook essentially the same manufacturing operation as
Welsbach. Id. Kerr-McGee would be strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in
the units or by waste from production of those units of the same product line, even
if previously manufactured by Welsbach. Id.
139. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 102.
140. Id. (citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825).
141. Id. at 103.
142. Id.
143. Id. Judge Atkins supported the cost spreading rationale by noting that
"Welsbach transferred to Kerr-McGee the resources that had previously been avail-
able to Welsbach for meeting its responsibilities to persons injured by the product
line it operated." Id.
144. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 103. Judge Atkins noted that Kerr-McGee was a
sophisticated party with knowledge of the production of gas mantles and the waste
that is generated. Id. Therefore, Kerr-McGee should have been able to gauge the
risks associated with its acquisition. Id.
19961
17
Farrell: Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.: Recongnizing a Need for Congres
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
126 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 109
tion of liability upon Kerr-McGee was justified on the grounds that
Kerr-McGee had received the benefit of Welsbach's trade name and
goodwill.145
Judge Atkins concluded that, in his opinion, the New Jersey
Supreme Court would apply the doctrine of strict liability to envi-
ronmental torts. 146 Further, Judge Atkins noted that while New
Jersey should have a voice in the development of its common law,
there was no procedure available to certify such a question to the
New Jersey Supreme Court. 147 In the absence of a method to cer-
tify this question to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Judge Atkins
felt constrained to apply the law as the New Jersey Supreme Court
would were the issue brought before it.148 As a result, Judge Atkins
reluctantly joined in the majority opinion. 149
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit's decision to deny extension of the product
line doctrine of liability to include toxic tort cases is consistent with
New Jersey precedent. One troublesome aspect of the Kerr-McGee
decision is that state common law was used to decide an issue of
national importance. Regulation of the environment is an area in
which the national government has specifically asserted a signifi-
cant role. The importance of a unified method of regulating the
environment is self-evident. The absence of national regulation will
result in unpredictable results based on individual state interpreta-
tions of corporate law and tort law. If a corporation cannot accu-
145. Id. In support of his argument, Judge Atkins cited Ramirez for the propo-
sition that public policy mandates that a successor corporation bear the burden of
operating costs that other established business operations must ordinarily bear. Id.
(citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 822). The potential cost of liability must be considered
when evaluating the worth of a company, and insurance may be taken out to safe-
guard against any such claims. Id.
146. Id. at 107.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 103-104 (citing City ofPhila. Liad Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.
1993)). The court noted that its role was to restrain itself from imposing its own
views and rather interpret and apply the law as the New Jersey Supreme Court
would apply the law. Id. at 103-104.
149. Kerr-McGee, 37 F.3d at 104. Judge Atkins noted that the result of such a
decision may create an atmosphere where state rights may never be vindicated.
Primarily, the removal and jurisdictional statutes will be used as a sword
to prevent final resolution of a state claim. For example, where a defend-
ant realizes that the state's highest court has not ruled on their specific
factual circumstance, but has developed a doctrine that might be adverse
to that defendant, then the defendant will most assuredly remove the
case to federal court knowing that, on appeal, the circuit court will grant
summary judgment in their favor based on City of Philadelphia.
18
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rately estimate its liabilities, it cannot adequately plan for the
future. Inconsistent decisions are the result of state courts attempt-
ing to manipulate corporate law to cover an area that it was not
designed to cover. Extension of the special exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of corporate law into environmental torts will result in un-
foreseeable results.
Furthermore, the issues raised in Ramirez opposing the expan-
sion of successor corporation liability are persuasive in environmen-
tal tort actions. The court in Ramirez recognized that successor
corporate liability for defects of a predecessor's manufacturing
would have a crippling effect on business interests.150 A primary
justification for the expansion of successor corporation liability may
be that the successor is able to protect itself through the purchase
of insurance or indemnification contracts.151 This rationale, how-
ever, is insufficient to impose liability in environmental torts. First,
the court in Ramirez assumes that the successor will have extensive
knowledge of the manufacturing process of the predecessor, and
thereby, be able to anticipate liabilities. Even if this assumption is
true, the successor corporation would not necessarily have sophisti-
cated knowledge of potential environmental hazards. Therefore,
imposition of liability based on the successor's knowledge of the
industry would not be fair. Business planners would be hesitant to
purchase a company with unforeseen contingent liabilities, possibly
forcing smaller businesses into liquidation. Second, as previously
noted, it is not clear that insurance could be obtained to protect
against defective products or environmental hazards. 152
Business planning and purchasing insurance would be facili-
tated under a uniform, stable method of predicting successor cor-
poration liability. A predictable method of determining such
liability requires the abandonment of entrenched theories of cor-
porate law and tort law, and the development of a federal cause of
action for environmental torts. This can be achieved through Con-
gressional recognition of a private right of action for environmental
torts.
A Congressionally created private right of action would allow a
plaintiff to state a federal cause of action without reference to anti-
quated state corporate law principles. There are important distinc-
150. For a further discussion of the holding in Ramirez, see supra note 77 and
accompanying text.
151. Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 823.
152. For a further discussion of the difficulty of finding insurance to protect
against defective products, see supra note 82.
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tions between bringing a toxic tort cause of action under federal
law, as opposed to state law. Currently, a cause of action for a toxic
tort is based on corporate law principles that were not designed to
provide a remedy for personal injury cases. The general rule of
corporate law was written for the purpose of protecting minority
shareholders and their financial interests. Extending the principles
of state corporate law beyond their original bounds leads to the
same incongruous results found in the Amstead cases noted
above. 15 3
A private cause of action brought pursuant to a federal statute,
such as CERCLA, would remedy the situation. Unlike state corpo-
rate law, CERCLA was specifically written for the purpose of expe-
diting the cleanup of toxic hazards and making responsible parties
pay for such damage. 154 CERCLA would, therefore, serve as a bet-
ter conduit than state corporate law for protecting the interests of
persons hurt as a result of an environmental hazard. Reliance on
this federal statute would provide uniformity in an area of national
interest. The uniformity would additionally allow business planners
to better predict contingent liabilities and purchase insurance to
spread the cost of such risks. The sale price of a business would
then more accurately reflect its true worth and the costs of environ-
mental torts would be more equitably spread throughout society.
Congress did consider providing a private federal cause of ac-
tion to individuals harmed by environmental pollution, prior to the
enactment of CERCLA. On April 2, 1980, Rep. Florio introduced a
toxic waste bill that provided for private recovery for injury to
"property," "economic loss," and most importantly, "personal in-
jury" caused by environmental pollution. 155 However, the federal
cause of action for toxic torts became a divisive issue in the House,
and eventually the proposal was stricken from Rep. Florio's bill.156
Congress again attempted to provide a private individual with a
federal toxic tort cause of action in Senate bill S1480.157 Senate bill
153. Moreover, numerous state definitions of successor liability, rather than a
single federal statute, leads to forum shopping. For a discussion of the Amsted
cases, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20. See also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding Congress intended that
those responsible for disposal of chemical poisons bear cost of cleanup).
155. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5(a); 126 CONG. REc. 7490 (1980).
156. Id.
157. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; 125 CONG. REc. 17,988-95 (1979). This bill
held a responsible party liable for "all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including
rehabilitation costs, due to personal injury." Id. at 17,991.
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S1480 was the leading Senate bill in the legislative process which
resulted in the passage of CERCLA.' 58 The private recovery provi-
sion of S1480 contained two subsections.159 The first subsection al-
lowed recovery for the cost of remedying the problem, while the
second subsection provided recovery for personal injuries.1 60 Ulti-
mately, the version of the Senate bill S1480 Congress enacted, in
the form of CERCLA, contained only the first subsection. 161 De-
spite the refusal to enact the second subsection of S1480, some Sen-
ators believed that the first subsection incorporated a private right
of action for toxic torts. That is, the first subsection as enacted,
would provide victims adequate compensation for their injuries. 162
These comments cannot, however, be taken as indicative of a Con-
gressional intent to provide for a private right of action, nor do they
allow federal courts to imply such a right.163 In fact, legislative his-
tory on this matter indicates that Congress had no intent to estab-
lish a private right of action.16 4
158. Mark E. Anthony Reisch, Analyst, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES PoLicY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS FOR THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WoRS, A LEGIsLA-
TIVE HISrORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LABILn-v ACT OF 1980 (Superfund), Public Law 96-510 VI (Comm. Print
1983). This bill established a no-fault victim compensation scheme and created a
federal cause of action for persons injured by hazardous materials. Id. at V.
159. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; 125 CONG. REc. 17,988, 17,991.
160. Id.
161. See CERCLA §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607-75.
162. 126 CONG. REc. S30,932 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statements of Sen.
Randolph).
163. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche, the
United States Supreme Court refused to infer a private remedy for damages in a
complex securities case. Id. at 578. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
overruled the factors previously relied on in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in
determining if a private right of action existed. Id. at 575-76. Rather than relying
on the Cort four factor test, the Court held that the power to create a private right
is ultimately a question of Congressional intent and "not whether this Court thinks
it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law. Id. at
578. See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that whether
to infer private cause of action from federal statute is determined by Congressional
intent).
164. See Amending and Extending the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980: Superfund Hearings Before the Committee on Environ-
mental and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1003 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings].
The committee noted:
During consideration of CERCLA by the 96th Congress, supporters
of the legislation lobbied for provisions granting private rights of action
for so-called "toxic torts." Congress ultimately decided that a need for
such provisions had not been demonstrated.
However, it did authorize a study under section 301(e) of CERCLA
to resolve the issue of the adequacy of existing legal remedies in this area.
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Absent demonstrable Congressional intent, a federal cause of
action can only be created through an explicit act of Congress.16 5
Congress should act and recognize a private right of action for toxic
torts because the damage from toxic waste treatment and disposal
has become a national problem. In its debates concerning a private
right of action, Congress could not have foreseen the inadequacies
of state law remedies to assure compensation for damages from
toxic substance releases. 166 Moreover, the purpose of CERCLA, to
make responsible parties pay for the damage they have caused,
would be properly served through Congressional recognition of a
federal cause of action. 167 While some analysts have argued that
the imposition of a federal cause of action would necessitate the
creation of a new body of "Federal common law," 168 such a body of
federal common law has already developed to facilitate CERCLA's
implementation. 16 9 Recognizing the need for national uniformity
in applying successor corporation liability under CERCLA, one
court noted that the general doctrine of successor liability rather
that narrow state statutes should guide a court's analysis in this
area. 170
The 'Section 301(e) Study Group,' ... unanimously decided not to rec-
ommend a new Federal cause of action.
Id. at 997.
165. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). The
Court in Texas Indus. wrote that a private right of action could arise two ways: (1)
through the affirmative creation of a right of action by Congress; or (2) through
the power of the federal courts to fashion a federal common law. Id. at 641-43.
166. The last study conducted on the appropriateness of creating a private
right of action for toxic torts was done in 1982. See A Report To Congress In Compli-
ance With Section 301(e) Of The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, Committee on Environment and Public Works, 96-510
(1982). Because the topic of a private right of action has not been addressed since
a brief consideration of it before the House Energy Committee in 1994, "the rec-
ord before the Congress on this issue remains as it was when CERCLA was en-
acted." Hearings, supra note 164, at 998.
167. See H.R. REP No. 1016(11), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.CAN. 6119, 6119-20.
168. Hearings, supra note 164, at 999.
169. See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 n.9 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding in dicta that federal law would be appropriate for determining
successor corporation liability under CERCLA); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco,
Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating successor liability under CERCLA
is governed by federal law); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex 851 F.2d
86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 837 (1989) (same); Hunt's Generator
Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 882 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (deter-
mining successor corporation liability is governed by federal common law).
170. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990). The Ninth Circuit held that the legislative history of CERCLA demonstrates
that Congress intended the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement
the statute. Id. (citing United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 808-09
22




The Third Circuit was correct in its holding in Kerr-Mcgee be-
cause there must be a limit to corporate liability in New Jersey.
Kerr-McGee did not have the capacity to acquire the risk spreading
role of its predecessor in a toxic tort context. In addition, the good-
will that Kerr-McGee acquired was related to the product line of
Welsbach and not to the contaminated site. Therefore, it would be
inappropriate for New Jersey to impose liability on a corporation
that did not pollute New Jersey land, nor operate on land polluted
by others. The fact that Kerr-McGee had deep pockets and could
be traced to business dealings with a corporation that did pollute
NewJersey land is too attenuated a connection tojustify the imposi-
tion of liability.
Corporate law liability was originally developed to protect
shareholders and their financial interests and is an unwieldy, inef-
fective means of providing a remedy in environmental cases. Appli-
cation of corporate law principles in environmental cases results in
inconsistent rulings among jurisdictions. Such a system places un-
due economic burdens on corporate entities that never could have
foreseen such liabilities. A better rule would be to adopt a federal
right of action for toxic torts based on CERCLA that incorporates
federal common law principles.
Shawn R Farrell
(S.D. Ohio 1983). In addition, the court noted that the purpose of CERCLA to
impose liability upon responsible parties would be frustrated by the adoption of
state law. Id. at n.2. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that a state's law that un-
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